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I. INTRODUCTION
Jack Balkin makes several contributions in this Lecture. He proposes a set 
of “laws of robotics” for an “Algorithmic Society” (i.e., one characterized by 
“social and economic decision-making by algorithms, robots, and AI agents”).1
These laws both elegantly encapsulate and add new principles to a growing 
movement for accountable design and deployment of algorithms.2 My purpose 
in commenting on his Lecture is threefold: (1) to contextualize his proposal as 
a kind of regulation of regulation, familiar from the perspective of 
administrative law, (2) to expand the range of methodological perspectives 
capable of identifying “algorithmic nuisance,” a key concept in this Lecture,3
and (3) to propose a fourth law of robotics to ensure the viability of Balkin’s 
first three laws.
Balkin argues that “algorithms (a) construct identity and reputation through 
(b) classification and risk assessment, creating the opportunity for (c) 
discrimination, normalization, and manipulation, without (d) adequate 
transparency, accountability, monitoring, or due process.”4 In response to these 
                                                                                                                     
Professor of Law, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law; J.D., 
Yale Law School; MPhil, Oxford University; BA, Harvard University. 
1 Jack Balkin, The Three Laws of Robotics in the Age of Big Data, 78 Ohio St. L.J. 
1217, 1217, 1219 (2017). Algorithmic information processing is in effect the “brain” of 
robotics and AI agents. See generally PEDRO DOMINGOS, THE MASTER ALGORITHM (2015). 
Balkin warns that “[t]he dream of the Algorithmic Society is the omniscient governance of 
society.” Balkin, supra, at 1226.
2 For more on this movement, see Frank Pasquale, Digital Star Chamber, AEON (Aug. 
18, 2015), https://aeon.co/essays/judge-jury-and-executioner-the-unaccountable-algorithm 
[https://perma.cc/N4DA-BLNJ] (“Algorithmic accountability is a big tent project, requiring 
the skills of theorists and practitioners, lawyers, social scientists, journalists and others. It’s
an urgent, global cause with committed and mobilised experts looking for support.”). 
3 Balkin, supra note 1, at 1232–33.
4 While Balkin crystallizes this set of problems of algorithms in his discussion of his 
proposed third law, it buoys the normative justification for all three of his laws. Id. at 1239.
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and other problems caused by algorithmic processing of data, he proposes three 
laws for an Algorithmic Society: 
(1) With respect to clients, customers, and end-users, algorithm users are 
information fiduciaries.
(2) With respect to those who are not clients, customers, and end-users, 
algorithm users have public duties. If they are governments, this follows 
from their nature as governments. If they are private actors, their 
businesses are affected with a public interest, as constitutional lawyers 
would have said during the 1930s.
(3) The central public duty of algorithm users is to avoid externalizing the costs 
(harms) of their operations. The best analogy for the harms of algorithmic 
decision-making is not intentional discrimination, but socially unjustified 
pollution.5
Each of these laws will have important implications for the future of legal 
regulation of technology.
II. THE REGULATION OF REGULATION
I believe that Balkin’s concept of information fiduciary is well developed 
and hard to challenge.6 In our increasingly Algorithmic Society, software-driven 
devices are increasingly taking on roles once reserved to professionals with clear 
fiduciary duties.7 A manufacturer of a medical device offering diagnoses should 
be held to the same standards we would impose on the physician it is replacing. 
Otherwise, the legal playing field will be unfairly tilted—holding physicians to 
standards that their would-be robotic replacements can evade.
Software-based replacements for attorneys should also operate on a level 
playing field. Sadly, federal antitrust policymakers have ignored this principle 
in the service of a broadly anti-labor agenda.8 When North Carolina attempted 
to modernize its regulation of software-based legal services by preventing legal 
software manufacturers from foisting terms of service on users that denied them 
consumer protections afforded to clients of attorneys, the Federal Trade 
Commission and Department of Justice weighed in to criticize the state and 
threaten antitrust action against it.9 Framed as an attack on attorney self-
                                                                                                                     
5 Id. at 1227 (footnote omitted).
6 See id. at 1227–31.
7 Id. at 1230–31.
8 For a precis on this trend in antitrust enforcement, see Frank Pasquale, When Antitrust 
Becomes Pro-Trust: The Digital Deformation of U.S. Competition Policy, 2 ANTITRUST 
CHRON. 46, 47–48 (2017), https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/
2017/05/AC_May.pdf [https://perma.cc/5LX2-9V4D].
9 See generally Joint Letter from Marina Lao, Dir., Office of Policy Planning, Fed. 
Trade Comm’n & Robert Potter, Chief, Legal Policy Section, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, to Bill Cook, Senator, N.C. Senate (June 10, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/
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protection, the agencies’ intervention had flimsy foundations in economic 
policy, and evidenced little to no awareness of literature on the pitfalls of 
automation.10 They appear committed to promoting software as a substitute for 
attorneys, even though the sellers of such software often include exculpatory 
clauses (or other limitations of liability) that severely disadvantage users.11 Such 
clauses prematurely extinguish litigation over bad outcomes, which could help 
both attorneys and consumers better understand the risks involved in AI 
approaches to law.12
Balkin’s second law—imposing public duties—also has substantial support 
in extant literature. Lori Andrews proposed a bill of rights for users of social 
media platforms;13 I have applied the idea of business affected with the public 
interest to search engines.14 Balkin is right to support initiatives to bring such 
accountability to algorithmic systems generally—especially ones that have 
physical effects on individuals or the environment. Even Uber, a notoriously 
lawless firm, has indicated its interest in giving drivers an opportunity to contest 
algorithmic “deactivations” (i.e., firings).15 This step toward due process is 
                                                                                                                     
documents/advocacy_documents/comment-federal-trade-commission-staff-antitrust-division-
addressing-north-carolina-house-bill-436/160610commentncbill.pdf [https://perma.cc/X47U-
3EZR].
10 See Sandeep Vaheesan & Frank Pasquale, The Politics of Professionalism: 
Reappraising Occupational Licensure and Competition Policy, ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 7
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 7), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2881732 [https://perma.cc/DT88-
5QJK] (arguing that while automation is supported by claims of efficiency, “[e]fficiency 
maximization is laden with implicit political judgments on the role of the state, the existing 
distribution of wealth, and human behavior”).
11 See, e.g., H.R. 436, 2015 Gen. Assemb., 2015 Sess. (N.C. 2016) (exempting certain 
website providers from the definition of the “practice of law” and creating additional 
requirements for website providers).
12 See MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS,
AND THE RULE OF LAW 139–40 (2013) (describing suboptimal social outcomes arising out of 
exculpatory clauses).
13 LORI ANDREWS, I KNOW WHO YOU ARE AND I SAW WHAT YOU DID: SOCIAL 
NETWORKS AND THE DEATH OF PRIVACY 189–91 (2011) (proposing a “Social Network 
Constitution”); see also REBECCA MACKINNON, CONSENT OF THE NETWORKED: THE 
WORLDWIDE STRUGGLE FOR INTERNET FREEDOM 179–80 (2012) (describing the Global 
Network Initiative, which is “dedicated to helping Internet and telecommunications 
companies uphold their users’ and customers’ rights to freedom of expression and privacy 
around the world in ways that are credible and accountable”). 
14 See Frank Pasquale, Dominant Search Engines: An Essential Cultural & Political 
Facility, in THE NEXT DIGITAL DECADE: ESSAYS ON THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET 401, 401–
02 (Berin Szoka & Adam Marcus eds., 2010); Frank Pasquale, Internet Nondiscrimination 
Principles: Commercial Ethics for Carriers and Search Engines, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 263, 
277–79. 
15 Josh Eidelson, Uber Found an Unlikely Friend in Organized Labor: A Company-
Funded Guild for Drivers Promises Not to Strike, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 27, 
2016), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-27/uber-found-an-unlikely-friend-in-
organized-labor [https://perma.cc/RJM7-L22C].
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appropriate for a firm that exercises something like governance authority over 
important aspects of our transportation systems.16
Many forces tend to regulate our conduct, ranging from government to 
corporations to professionals. Advanced legal regimes also create safeguards to 
assure that regulation does not become too oppressive—in effect, modes of 
regulating that regulation. The Administrative Procedure Act is one example, 
counterbalancing the potentially overweening power of the executive branch 
with judicial monitoring and supervision.17 While large online platforms 
increasingly act as de facto “courthouses,” they are still constrained in the types 
of requirements they can require users to adopt.18 Ancient professions like law 
and medicine self-regulate (under the active supervision of the state) to reduce 
the ability of rogue attorneys and doctors to abuse the power they will 
predictably have in important episodes of their clients’ and patients’ lives. 
Whenever algorithms move into any of these areas, new forms of regulation of 
regulation will need to complement the old. Without such modernization, 
regulatory arbitrage will artificially induce many forms of artificial intelligence 
to prematurely supplant more accountable institutions.19
                                                                                                                     
16 Rory van Loo, The Law of Consumer Markets (2016) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Yale University) (on file with author) (giving many other examples of 
procedures at firms that resolve disputes by offering customers some opportunity to learn of 
the evidence against them, contest it, and receive a reasoned response to their complaint or 
appeal). 
17 See, e.g., ANDREW F. POPPER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 59 (2d ed. 2010). 
18 Rory Van Loo, The Corporation as Courthouse, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 547, 554 (2016) 
(“Corporations . . . design procedures and shape the de facto substantive rules governing the 
vast majority of consumer disputes.”).
19 For an early example of this type of imbalance, compare the application of FCRA to 
employers using old-school credit bureaus to investigate applicants with the free hand they 
have when deploying Google to assemble automated dossiers via name search queries. Frank 
Pasquale, Rankings, Reductionism, and Responsibility, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 115, 136 (2006) 
(“The FCRA requires credit bureaus to permit individuals to dispute negative information 
on their credit reports and to give their own side of the story on reports generated for potential 
creditors, insurers, and employers.”). No such requirements hamper the more automated 
Google name search queries in the United States, while Europe has attempted to remedy the 
discrepancy with prerogatives like the right of erasure and the right to be forgotten. See Frank
Pasquale, Reforming the Law of Reputation, 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 515, 516–17 (2015). For a 
definition of “premature disruption,” see Brian Sheppard, Incomplete Innovation and the 
Premature Disruption of Legal Services, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1797, 1825–26, 1876 
(2015) (describing how premature disruptions occur when “an industry has experienced a 
diminution in its capacity or willingness to meet demand for a core function at pre-disruption 
levels of quality, leading to a reduction in welfare that exceeds the benefits brought by the 
innovation” and applying this theory of premature disruption to legal services (footnote 
omitted)).
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III. IDENTIFYING ALGORITHMIC NUISANCE
The third law is an important extension and clarification of extant concerns 
about algorithmic accountability and a critical intervention in these debates. 
Balkin’s worries about the applicability of discrimination law to algorithmic 
processes are well founded. Activists have accused algorithmic processes of 
bias,20 while their owners or programmers have deflected those charges by 
insisting no one at their firm intended to discriminate.21 At present, the concept 
of “disparate impact” has permitted an uneasy peace between the two sides: 
responsible designers of algorithmic systems are committing to trying to avoid 
lopsided distributions of benefits or burdens with respect to historically 
recognized categories, such as race, gender, or sexual orientation. With respect 
to finance and credit determinations, regulation has already ensured that “intent” 
is not a sine qua non for liability.22
This is important, because, as Mireille Hildebrandt has argued, the “data-
driven agency” common in algorithmic systems builds on “information and 
behaviour, not meaning and action.”23 Hildebrandt’s contrast between 
                                                                                                                     
20 See, e.g., Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing
[https://perma.cc/XNH4-JV7K].
21 See FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT 
CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION 39 (2015) (discussing Latanya Sweeney’s work); see 
also Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 21, State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2016) (No. 
2015AP157-CR); Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent at 21, State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749 
(Wis. 2016) (No. 2015AP157-CR); WILLIAM DIETERICH ET AL., COMPAS RISK SCALES:
DEMONSTRATING ACCURACY EQUITY AND PREDICTIVE PARITY 1 (July 2016), 
http://go.volarisgroup.com/rs/430-MBX-989/images/ProPublica_Commentary_Final_070616.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GLP4-AKPS] (responding to Angwin et al., supra note 20). The binary of
“discrimination” or nondiscrimination may be ill-suited to probabilistic evaluations of harm. 
Abe Gong, Ethics for Powerful Algorithms (1 of 4), MEDIUM (July 12, 2016), 
https://medium.com/@AbeGong/ethics-for-powerful-algorithms-1-of-3-a060054efd84#.35
pjrg22k [https://perma.cc/U6VW-22FU].
22 ROBINSON + YU, KNOWING THE SCORE: NEW DATA, UNDERWRITING, AND 
MARKETING IN THE CONSUMER CREDIT MARKETPLACE 21–22, 29 (2014), 
https://www.teamupturn.com/static/files/Knowing_the_Score_Oct_2014_v1_1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TK67-MD9H] (describing the use of fringe and alternative data for credit 
scoring). Employment law has related concepts. See Ifeoma Ajunwa, Assistant Professor, 
Univ. of D.C. Sch. of Law, Written Testimony from the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission Public Meeting on Big Data in the Workplace (Oct. 13, 2016),
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/10-13-16/ajunwa.cfm [https://perma.cc/AQP5-VAAK]
(describing practices used by some employers that are prone to having discriminatory 
effects); Clint Boulton, The Hidden Risk of Blind Trust in AI’s ‘Black Box,’ CIO MAG. (July 
6, 2017), http://www.cio.com/article/3204114/artificial-intelligence/the-hidden-risk-of-blind-trust-
in-ai-s-black-box.html [https://perma.cc/GD88-PAR5] (commenting that “AI in things like 
credit decisions, which might seem like an obvious area, is actually fraught with” legal land 
mines). 
23 Mireille Hildebrandt, Law as Information in the Era of Data-Driven Agency, 79 
MOD. L. REV. 1, 2 (2016).
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information and meaning here is critical. Meaning has been crucial to legal 
determinations. In criminal law, and even in many civil regulatory schemes 
(which might calibrate penalties based on willfulness), the meaning of an illegal 
action has been critical to the degree of culpability assigned to the defendant—
and even to the definition of an act as illegal in itself.24 But as the economy has 
grown more complex, strict liability grew as a conceptual resource to hold 
persons or firms accountable for damages they caused but may not have 
intended. Nuisance, too, has been a crucial tool for checking the negative effects 
of systems that do not rise to the level of tort.
However, there have now been so many documented instances of 
algorithmic discrimination that I believe Balkin may be going a bit too far in his 
statement, “it is useless to model the duty or liability of algorithm operators on 
a respondeat superior theory—you can’t impute intentions, negligence, or 
malice from the algorithm to the operator, even—and especially—a self-
learning algorithm.”25 At this point, if a corporation decides to unleash an 
algorithm on Twitter substantially similar to Microsoft’s Tay, it should know 
that there is a very high likelihood it will begin spewing racist and sexist cant 
within days.26
Researchers can no longer hide behind a shield of disruptive 
experimentalism to deflect responsibility for such interventions. The literature 
on AI ethics, algorithmic system ethics, and big data and ethics is vast, well 
established, and easily accessible. For example, however well protected 
algorithmic speech may be by the First Amendment, we should at least leave 
open the possibility that programmers of bots on Twitter would have some 
liability for defamation if, say, their creations foreseeably disseminated slurs 
about a private figure.27 If that means keeping humans “in the loop” for the 
foreseeable future in such scenarios, so be it.28 That requirement would not 
                                                                                                                     
24 See JOSEPH VINING, FROM NEWTON’S SLEEP 299 (1995) (“There is no crime in any 
set of facts . . . unless there is a criminal state of mind.”). But see Lawrence B. Solum, 
Artificial Meaning, 89 WASH. L. REV. 69, 86 (2014) (“[T]he pricing of airline fares by 
algorithms (rather than humans) already provides part of a legally binding agreement. We 
have no difficulty understanding these terms—even though they do not reflect the mental 
states of a human being.”).
25 Balkin supra note 1, at 1234.
26 See Helena Horton, Microsoft Deletes ‘Teen Girl’ AI After It Became a Hitler-Loving 
Sex Robot Within 24 Hours, TELEGRAPH (Mar. 24, 2016), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
technology/2016/03/24/microsofts-teen-girl-ai-turns-into-a-hitler-loving-sex-robot-wit/
[https://perma.cc/2GT5-C9BG]; see also Chris Mills, Why Are Microsoft’s Chatbots All 
Assholes?, BGR (July 4, 2017), http://bgr.com/2017/07/04/microsoft-chatbot-zo-quran-
religion-plz-no/ [https://perma.cc/34DA-4B5R] (describing chatbot Zo’s bizarre answer to a 
reporter’s question as “a triple fail for Microsoft, because it’s a completely nonsensical off-
topic answer, wrong, and painfully insensitive”). 
27 On the protection of computerized speech, see Stuart Benjamin, Algorithms and 
Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1445, 1447–49 (2013).
28 On the right to a human in the loop, see Meg Leta Jones, The Right to a Human in 
the Loop: Political Constructions of Computer Automation & Personhood, 47 SOC. STUD.
SCI. 216, 217, 231–32 (2017). Not only speakers, but also largely automated intermediaries 
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merely be a salutary channeling of technology through law.29 It may also help 
address the putative future unemployment crises so often modeled as an 
inevitable consequence of technological development—rather than as a result of 
policymakers’ neglect.30
To be sure, negligence and intent-based causes of action may fade over time 
if society accepts more autonomous algorithms in online and offline contexts. 
The effects-based regime of responsibility that Balkin proposes, like the shift 
from consent- to use-based regulation in data protection law, will become more 
important over time. 
One critical question for such a regime is: how do we identify effects so 
negative that they merit regulatory intervention or liability? Balkin suggests a 
form of cost-benefit analysis: he compares algorithmic nuisance to “socially 
unjustified pollution” and urges policymakers to prevent algorithm users from 
“externalizing the costs [and harms] of their operations.”31 He argues that 
policymakers should focus regulation on reducing the negative effects of robotic 
methods that are not cost-benefit “justified from the standpoint of society as a 
whole.”32
While I agree that algorithmic processing of information can impose undue 
costs on third parties, I hope that cost-benefit analysis will only be one of the 
methods that we can use to identify algorithmic nuisance. Cost-benefit analysis 
is manipulable, and can conceal as much as it reveals about important value 
judgments.33 Deregulationists have recently deployed variants of cost-benefit
                                                                                                                     
disseminating such speech, may face legal requirements of responsibility. See, e.g., Melissa 
Eddy & Mark Scott, Delete Hate Speech or Pay Up, Germany Tells Social Media 
Companies, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/30/business/
germany-facebook-google-twitter.html [https://perma.cc/SVB5-N5BU].
29 For examples of such channeling, see generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CHANNELING 
TECHNOLOGY THROUGH LAW (1973) (describing the ways that the law “can be used to 
influence technological development”). For concrete examples of the proper role of 
communications professionals in automated information systems, see Frank Pasquale, The 
Automated Public Sphere, in BIG DATA, BIG BROTHER?: THE POLICIES AND POLITICS OF BIG 
DATA (Ann Rudinow Sætnan et al. eds., forthcoming 2018). 
30 On the role of law in forestalling future mass unemployment, see Frank Pasquale, To 
Replace or Respect: Futurology as if People Mattered, BOUNDARY2 (Jan. 20, 2015),
http://www.boundary2.org/2015/01/to-replace-or-respect-futurology-as-if-people-mattered/ 
[https://perma.cc/37DY-DDXR].
31 Balkin, supra note 1, at 1227, 1233 (“[W]e are talking about the socially unjustified 
use of computational capacities that externalizes costs onto innocent others.”). 
32 Id. at 1240. This approach could be realized in many ways. Ex post, technology 
producers could be required to compensate those whom they harm. Ex ante, a data levy could 
collect revenue in order to pay actuarially predictable claims, given experience of data 
breaches and other negative effects of data collection. 
33 See generally FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING 
THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004) (arguing that the value of 
cost-benefit analysis is severely limited in the context of “priceless” subjects, such as human 
life and environmental protection); DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, REGULATING FROM NOWHERE:
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE SEARCH FOR OBJECTIVITY (2010) (proposing that cost-
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analysis to sandbag financial regulation, an algorithm-rich field where 
academic-industry collaborations have all too often underestimated the risks 
from automation and modeling, and overestimated the costs of building 
safeguards into them.34
There is also a tension between the two key metaphors in Balkin’s 
discussion of algorithmic nuisance. He draws on environmental law,35 a move 
that has served intellectual property law well,36 as well as privacy scholars, who 
have analogized the diffuse harms arising out of misuse of data, to the harms 
finally recognized and countered by environmental law after property law failed 
to address them.37 But the appeal to environmental law principles fits uneasily 
with the economism of cost-benefit analysis. Many forms of environmental 
regulation that we now consider sacrosanct (think, for example, of Bill 
Eskridge’s characterization of the Endangered Species Act as a “super-
statute”38) would not survive contemporary Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA)-driven cost-benefit standards. 
Of course, it is possible to enter the field of cost-benefit battles and win. But 
it’s important to maintain deontological patterns of justification in the 
technology world to complement the utilitarianism of cost-benefit analysis. For
example, consider a firm that deploys resume-filtering software to choose new 
employees who will be like the employees who succeeded in the firm in the past. 
This could be based on thousands of variables, including available social 
network data of current employees and applicants. If the firm has had diversity 
problems in the past, it is likely to maintain this pattern of problems with such 
software.39 It is hard to quantify the cost of such lack of diversity, but as Jerry 
Kang has observed, it is not necessary for us to do so: such discrimination is in 
itself objectionable, regardless of its effects.40
                                                                                                                     
benefit analysis must be overhauled so that it factors context and long-term effects into its 
decision-making). 
34 See John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies 
and Implications, 124 YALE L.J. 882, 896 (2014).
35 As the mention of “environmental impact statements” suggests. See Balkin, supra
note 1, at 1234.
36 See James Boyle, A Politics of Intellectual Property: Environmentalism for the Net?,
47 DUKE L.J. 87, 108–12 (1997); Frank Pasquale, Toward an Ecology of Intellectual 
Property: Lessons from Environmental Economics for Valuing Copyright’s Commons, 8 
YALE J.L. & TECH. 78, 119–27 (2006).
37 Dennis D. Hirsch, Protecting the Inner Environment: What Privacy Regulation Can 
Learn from Environmental Law, 41 GA. L. REV. 1, 9–10 (2006).
38 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1242–
43 (2001).
39 See generally CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA
INCREASES INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY (2016) (arguing that machine learning 
based on training data from the past is not a guarantee of fairness, but rather a way of 
propagating past practices and automating the status quo). Moreover, thanks to activists like 
O’Neil’s work and patient explanations in dozens of venues, the firm should at this point 
know that it will do so.
40 Jerry Kang, Race.net Neutrality, 6 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 1, 13 (2007).
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We should also leave open the door to flat bans on certain data uses (e.g., 
no use of credit scores based in any way on health data), even if well-paid 
econometricians can demonstrate extraordinary gains in economic efficiency 
arising out of such classifications. Consider robotic patrols that could easily 
reduce injuries and increase order at protest policing. They could also raise the 
possibility of perfected, distant, “push button” law enforcement that has never 
been part of humane legal orders.41 A just society could decide to ban such 
patrols, even if such a decision was most likely to decrease welfare overall, on 
the grounds that it was more concerned with avoiding a type of automated 
oppression whose likelihood of occurrence was impossible to calculate a priori.
To complement Balkin’s story of the Golem,42 I am reminded of the Gospel 
of Luke, where Jesus relates the parable of the lost sheep.43 Leaving ninety-nine 
sheep in “open country” to find one is not necessarily an economically rational 
decision.44 Similarly, the Endangered Species Act has been decried by 
technocrats as placing inordinate value on unusual species. But each decision 
reflects altogether human spontaneity and idealism. Such values should not be 
sacrificed in the name of some scientific monetization of the value of ecosystem 
services, or similar calculations.
Just as we cannot quantify in monetary terms all forms of human 
transformation of the natural world that are discomfiting enough to merit legal 
regulation, we will not always be able to offer precise valuations of the alarm or 
apprehension we feel at certain algorithmic transformations of human social 
relations. The analogy between algorithmic harm and pollution may be 
challenged as unduly scientific. We know that if particulate levels double, lung 
cancer cases will probably go up by x%. Do we know what happens to an 
economy if, for instance, a secret scoring mechanism consigns 1% of those 
scored to self-reinforcing cycles of exclusion (to continue the parable of the lost 
sheep)? Or if a beauty algorithm picks a disproportionately white selection of 
finalists?45 We can work to avoid such harms, without trying to quantify them.
                                                                                                                     
41 Jathan Sadowski & Frank Pasquale, The Spectrum of Control: A Social Theory of the 
Smart City, 20 FIRST MONDAY (July 6, 2015), http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/
view/5903/4660 [https://perma.cc/UKP4-3U2H]. For more on the horrors of “push button”
force, see NORBERT WIENER, GOD AND GOLEM, INC.: A COMMENT ON CERTAIN POINTS 
WHERE CYBERNETICS IMPINGES ON RELIGION 24–25 (1964).
42 Balkin, supra note 1, at 1222–23; Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Taming the Golem: 
Challenges of Ethical Algorithmic Decision Making, N.C. J.L. & TECH (forthcoming 2017) 
(manuscript at 7–8), https://fpf.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Golem_May153-1.docx
[https://perma.cc/7NSK-JNN2] (examining the potential for bias and discrimination in 
automated algorithmic decision-making).
43 “Suppose one of you has a hundred sheep and loses one of them. Doesn’t he leave 
the ninety-nine in the open country and go after the lost sheep until he finds it? And when 
he finds it, he joyfully puts it on his shoulders and goes home.” Luke 15:4–6.
44 Id.
45 Jordan Pearson, Why an AI-Judged Beauty Contest Picked Nearly All White Winners,
MOTHERBOARD (Sept. 5, 2016), http://motherboard.vice.com/read/why-an-ai-judged-beauty-
contest-picked-nearly-all-white-winners [https://perma.cc/4PAE-C2MR].
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IV. THE ATTRIBUTION PROBLEM IN ROBOTICS
A voice-parsing algorithm might predict Supreme Court votes much more 
cheaply than the justices and clerks arguing and writing out decisions.46 But no 
respectable legal system would substitute it for actual legal determinations, at 
whatever level of the justice system it might be deployed, because it cannot 
relate its rationale with reasons that have normative weight.47 Explainability 
matters because the process of reason-giving is intrinsic to juridical 
determinations—not simply one modular characteristic jettisoned as 
anachronistic once automated prediction is sufficiently advanced.
One key element of explainability is a clear sense of the history of a robot—
how was it first programmed, to what has it been exposed, and how has this 
interplay between hardware, software, and the external environment resulted in 
present behavior. At the core of Balkin’s Laws of Robotics is a concern to make 
certain individuals (whose role parallels that of the golem-creating rabbi) 
responsible for their creations.48 He does not want to create a set of legal
obligations for algorithms or robots.49 Rather, he builds on our centuries-long 
experience with regulating persons.50 He observes that regulating the owners 
and programmers of artificial intelligence will require some monitoring of what 
they are creating and coding.51 To guarantee the efficacy of such monitoring, 
regulators may need to establish some ground rules, or preregulation, of the 
interactions algorithms will have with the wider world.
I completely agree with Balkin’s point that the robot as substitute for human 
actor all too often acts as a “fetish or deflection away from the social bases of 
power.”52 But there is a sizeable literature anticipating or hoping for fully 
autonomous robotics or software systems, unmonitored and even uncontrolled 
by any person.53 This type of unmooring of machines from responsible human 
                                                                                                                     
46 Bryce J. Dietrich et al., Emotional Arousal Predicts Voting on the U.S. Supreme 
Court 2–6 (Oct. 12, 2016) (draft manuscript), http://people.hmdc.harvard.edu/~renos/papers/
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emotional arousal, or excitement directed at an attorney compared to his or her opponent, 
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Behaviorism, U. TORONTO L.J. (forthcoming 2018) (critiquing the use of machine learning 
and artificial intelligence to predict judicial behavior).
48 Balkin, supra note 1, at 1222–23.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 1223–25.
52 Id. at 1224.
53 See generally SAMIR CHOPRA & LAURENCE F. WHITE, A LEGAL THEORY FOR 
AUTONOMOUS ARTIFICIAL AGENTS (2011) (discussing how our current philosophies and 
legal theories can accommodate the world’s progressively sophisticated AI technology); 
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agents is generally a terrible idea.54 To preserve the world Balkin depicts—
where there clearly is a rabbi for each golem—we may need to ensure that robots 
and algorithmic agents are traceable to and identified with their creators.55
First steps have already been taken in this direction. Analysts have proposed 
a “license plate for drones” to link any reckless or negligent flying to the drone’s 
owner or controller, and drone registration now occurs in the United States.56
Computer systems already try to solve or mitigate the “attribution problem” in 
cybersecurity, which occurs when someone attacks a system anonymously, by 
correlating signatures of action to known bad actors. There is broad moral 
agreement that opaque computational systems should not be allowed to make 
life-and-death decisions on battlefields. An international campaign to ban “killer 
robots” is now attempting to codify such ethical commitments.57 And even if 
they do not succeed in obtaining a ban on such weapons, they should at least try 
to assure provenance designation on any autonomous weapon system.58 So, too, 
we might propose a fourth law to complement Balkin’s first three: “A robot 
must always indicate the identity of its creator, controller, or owner.”
Such a proviso could also serve as a “zeroth” law, complementing the meta-
principle that Asimov introduced as his Zeroth Law of Robotics (namely, that 
robots must not harm humanity).59 In this case, the foundational status of a law 
of provenance arises out of its presumption that any given robot or algorithmic 
system has a creator, controller, or owner. The cutting edge of the AI, machine 
learning, and robotics fields emphasizes autonomy, whether of smart contracts, 
high-frequency trading algorithms (at least in time spans undetectable by 
humans), or future robots. There is a nebulous notion of “out of control” robots, 
which escape their creator’s control—and even ideas that creators of such robots 
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future that includes robots in all aspects of life and examining the underlying technology and 
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55 There is already some work being done on this. See Joseph Lorenzo Hall, ‘License 
Plates’ for Drones?, CDT BLOG (Mar. 8, 2013), https://cdt.org/blog/license-plates-for-
drones/ [https://perma.cc/KSB7-ZU6A]; Mark Austen et al., Requirements for a Global 
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56 See 14 C.F.R. § 48.15 (2016) (requiring the registration of all small unmanned 
aircraft other than model aircrafts as of August 29, 2016); Hall, supra note 55.
57 See generally CAMPAIGN TO STOP KILLER ROBOTS, https://www.stopkillerrobots.org 
[https://perma.cc/N46K-9D4V] (describing a movement that encourages countries to create 
multilateral standards or regulations to cover AI applications).
58 International law requires combatants to identify themselves. See Hague Convention 
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex, art. 1, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 
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CAMPAIGN TO STOP KILLER ROBOTS, supra note 57.
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should escape responsibility once that “escape” has occurred. A requirement 
that any AI or robotics system has some designated party responsible for its 
action would help squelch such ideas.
Of course, some robots and algorithms will appreciably evolve away from 
the ideals programmed into them by their owners, as a result of interactions with 
other persons and machines (think, for instance, of advanced self-driving cars 
that evolve as a result of multiple influences).60 In such cases, there may be 
multiple potentially responsible parties (to use a term from the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, or CERCLA) for 
any given machine’s development and eventual actions.61 Whatever affects the 
evolution of such machines, the original creator should be obliged to build in 
certain constraints on the code’s evolution to a) record influences and b) prevent 
bad outcomes. Once another person or entity hacks or disables those constraints, 
the hacker is responsible for the robot’s wrongdoing.
For a concrete application of this principle, consider a chatbot that gradually 
learns certain patterns of dialogue from interactions on Twitter. According to 
some news accounts, Microsoft’s AI chatbot, Tay, quickly adopted the speech
patterns of a depressed Nazi sympathizer after only a few hours on Twitter.62
Microsoft did not program that outcome—but it should have known that it was 
a danger of exposing a bot to a platform notorious for its poor moderation of
harassment and hate speech. Moreover, to the extent the chatbot did log where 
the malign influences came from, it could report them to Twitter—which could, 
in some better version of itself, take some action to suspend or slow the flood of 
abuse coming from troll accounts and worse. 
The cornerstone of Balkin’s proposal is to create obligations of 
responsibility in systems that do not necessarily share the human experience of 
intent. To make his principles effective, regulators will need to require 
“responsibility-by-design” (to complement extant models of security-by-design 
and privacy-by-design). That may involve requiring certain hard-coded audit 
logs in both closed and open robotics, or licensing practices in open robotics 
that explicitly contemplate problematic outcomes (like business associate 
agreements governing data transfers in the HIPAA context).63 Like the “legal 
entity identifiers” now vital to initiatives to create a consolidated audit trail in 
finance, such initiatives will not simply regulate robotics post hoc, but will 
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necessarily influence systems development by foreclosing some design options 
and encouraging others.64
V. CONCLUSION
Balkin’s Lecture is a tour de force distillation of principles of algorithmic 
accountability, and a bold vison for entrenching them in regulatory principles. 
As he observes, “algorithms (a) construct identity and reputation through (b) 
classification and risk assessment, creating the opportunity for (c) 
discrimination, normalization, and manipulation, without (d) adequate 
transparency, accountability, monitoring, or due process.”65 They are, therefore, 
critically important features of our information society which demand 
immediately attention from regulators. High-level officials around the world 
need to put the development of a cogent and forceful response to these 
developments at the top of their agendas. Balkin’s “Laws of Robotics” is an 
ideal place to start, both to structure that discussion at a high level and to ground 
it in deeply rooted legal principles. 
It is rare to see a legal scholar not only work at the deepest levels of policy 
(in the sense of all those normative considerations that should inform legal 
decisions outside of the law governing the case) but also recommend in clear 
and precise language a coherent set of concrete recommendations that both 
exemplify principles of critical and social theory, and stand some chance of 
being adopted by current government officials. That is Balkin’s achievement in 
The Three Laws of Robotics in the Age of Big Data. It is work to celebrate and 
rally around, and an auspicious launch for Ohio State’s program in Big Data & 
Law.
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